In late October 2024, Cleafy’s Threat Intelligence team observed a significant spike in a new Android malware sample initially classified as TgToxic. However, further analysis revealed that while it shares some bot command similarities with the TgToxic family, the code diverges considerably from its original source. Many capabilities characteristic of TgToxic are notably absent, and some commands appear as placeholders without real implementation. Based on these findings, we started tracking this family as ToxicPanda.
ToxicPanda belongs to the modern RAT generation of mobile malware, as its Remote Access capabilities allow Threat Actors (TAs) to conduct Account Takeover (ATO) directly from the infected device, thus exploiting the On Device Fraud (ODF) technique. This consolidation of this technique has already been seen by other banking trojans, such as Medusa, Copybara, and, recently, BingoMod. Adopting a manual approach has several advantages: it requires less skilled developers, TAs can distribute the malware's target base to any banking customers, and bypass various behavioral detection countermeasures put in place by multiple banks and financial services.
Our analysis will reveal that the TAs behind ToxicPanda are Chinese speakers. Notably, it is uncommon for TAs from this geographical origin to conduct "banking fraud" operations targeting regions such as Europe and LATAM, indicating a potential shift or expansion in their operational focus.
Further analysis of the ToxicPanda botnet infrastructure granted our team access to comprehensive telemetry data, revealing the full extent of this campaign:
This geographical distribution underscores the ToxicPanda botnet's significant reach and adaptability. These numbers suggest that the operators are expanding their focus beyond primary European targets, hinting at a potential shift towards Latin America.
The following table represents a summary of the TTPs behind ToxicPanda campaigns:
From a technical standpoint, this sample exhibits reduced capabilities, especially compared to modern banking trojans. However, the notable differences between this sample and its “ancestor”, TGToxic, are intriguing. Most commands are either not implemented or exhibit poor refactoring, suggesting that TGToxic served as a foundational template for this malware. The removal of the Automatic Transfer System (ATS) routine and reduced obfuscation routines indicates a downgrade in technical sophistication.
These changes may reflect the developers' inexperience with foreign targets and the challenges of stricter regulations in certain countries, such as PSD2 (Payment Services Directive). Additionally, the shift in primary targets from crypto wallets to financial institutions aligns with the larger demographic of individuals holding bank accounts, at least for the EMEA region. The embedded notes within the code could further imply unfamiliarity with certain technical aspects, highlighting the complexities of adapting and shifting in a “brand new” operational environment.
Our analysts identified the following icons during this investigation. It is evident that TA employs a mix of well-known brands (e.g., Google Chrome, VISA) and decoy icons resembling dating apps to enhance the malware's deceptive capabilities and broaden its reach.
The malware’s key features include:
In this article, we will not delve into these features in detail, as they no longer introduce anything novel and are already widely adopted by modern banking trojans. As previously outlined, the actors behind this campaign likely prioritized their efforts on the operational aspects, given the linguistic barriers and regulatory challenges specific to these territories (e.g., PSD2), as well as the sophisticated countermeasures implemented by anti-fraud teams.
For this reason, in the following chapters, we will focus on some of the unique characteristics identified within the analyzed samples. We will then shift to a detailed examination of the command and control (C2) infrastructure, providing valuable insights into how the group manages and maintains the botnet on an operational level.
Some interesting artefacts left on the APK are related to files called langs.json and XX.json (where XX is a language file, e.g., it.json, es.json, etc.).
Analyzing the langs.json JSON file, we could spot applications and classes associated with different Android systems or vendor-specific apps (e.g., Samsung, Xiaomi, Huawei, Oppo). These configurations focus on system-level management applications, backup or cleaning utilities as well as security permissions (all applications likely to interfere with or limit the purpose of the malware). Moreover, analyzing the whole structure is possible to catch quite interesting keys, such as pkg, text and action.
Those keywords are structured to contain specific information that will be parsed later on from the dedicated malware component. The figure above shows an example of “preventing” users from removing and generally accessing system settings, referring them back to the home screen.
In details:
Matching internal telemetries and the mechanism observed, it's also possible to infer target countries that are the main focus of this threat. Limiting targets to Europe, it's possible to observe Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, and the UK. However, considering the linguistic ties between Spanish and Portuguese and the LATAM region, we must recognize that this area could also be a significant target.
One notable characteristic of this malware, which aligns with practices commonly observed among Chinese-speaking developers, is its capability to access phone albums, convert images to BASE64, and transmit them back to the command and control (C2) server. While this technique is not entirely new— it has already been observed with malware like TrickMo — it represents a significant strategy for gathering potentially sensitive information (e.g., screenshots containing login credentials or virtual cards) from user devices.
In addition, it was possible to discover the following config.toml file inside the asset/ folder:
This file defines configuration settings for a communication or tunneling system, potentially facilitating connections between the malware’s infrastructure and remote devices or servers.
As the previous image shows, this file contains a hardcoded DNS service (114.114.114.114), a Chinese Free Public DNS service named 114DNS. While 114DNS is a legitimate public DNS, its use in malware or suspicious configurations can indicate a connection between TAs and China. Also, since this service is not commonly used outside the region, TAs still consider this region a testing ground for setting up their malware operations against new geographical regions.
ToxicPanda significantly overlaps the command names utilised in the TgToxic malware family. Our analysis identified 61 commands common to both, with highly distinctive names that suggest their presence in both malware is unlikely to be coincidental. This overlap indicates that the same TA (or closed affiliates) could be behind both malware.
Conversely, ToxicPanda introduces 33 new commands, some lacking implementation. Additionally, several commands from TgToxic persist in this variant but remain unimplemented—particularly those associated with EasyClick, a framework enabling UI automation scripts via JavaScript. In TgToxic, this framework was exploited to hijack the Android device’s user interface (UI), allowing for actions such as monitoring user input and automating clicks and gestures. In contrast, ToxicPanda does not rely on this framework, though its associated commands remain in the code with blank implementations.
The complete list of commands can be found in Appendix A - Malware Commands.
ToxicPanda contains three hard-coded domains designated for establishing a connection with the Command and Control (C2) server:
Unlike more sophisticated malware that may employ advanced techniques such as Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) or dynamic configuration updates to determine C2 endpoints, this malware relies on static, pre-defined domains embedded directly within its code.
In the analyzed sample, domain selection is managed through a switch statement, which defaults to the first domain (dksu[.]top) by setting a specific switch variable to 1. This approach simplifies the initial C2 connection process but reduces the malware's adaptability in cases where one or more of these domains are blocked. However, the C2 server can modify this behavior in real-time by leveraging the setCommandStyle command to change the C2 domain remotely, providing some degree of flexibility despite the hard-coded nature of the initial configuration. While the malware lacks sophisticated C2 domain generation or obfuscation techniques, combining hard-coded domains with selective remote configuration demonstrates a balance between simplicity and operational effectiveness, allowing the attackers to maintain control with minimal complexity.
The chosen domain is prefixed with the subdomain ctrl to establish communication, and an initial HTTP request is sent over HTTPS to initiate contact with the C2 server. This “handshake” request prompts a response containing a JSON payload, including connection parameters such as the port number. This port will subsequently be used for a persistent connection to the C2 server via the WebSocket protocol, which enables low-latency, bidirectional communication.
With the WebSocket protocol, the initial message exchange involves a “login” request from the infected device to the C2 server. This message includes a unique Device ID, allowing the C2 server to identify, register, and monitor each infected device within its botnet. Once the login is successful, the C2 server responds with specific commands based on the fraud campaign’s goals. These commands, outlined in prior sections, prompt the infected device to carry out malicious actions as instructed by the C2 server.
ToxicPanda employs AES encryption in ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode to secure network communication. The encryption key is hard-coded within the malware’s source code, derived from a specific byte array, and converted into a string format. In the sample under analysis, this hard-coded encryption key is 0623U2SKT3YY3QB9P.
Our analysts successfully obtained visibility into the botnet’s command and control (C2) panel during our investigation into the ToxicPanda Android banking trojan campaign. This visibility was a significant breakthrough, providing crucial insights into the operations of the TAs behind this ongoing banking fraud campaign.
Understanding the inner workings of a botnet control panel is vital in the broader context of Threat Intelligence, especially within the realm of Android banking trojans. Visibility into these C2 infrastructures allows analysts to gather invaluable intelligence regarding the techniques and procedures employed by TAs. It also helps us understand the scope of the compromised devices and the specific actions that operators can perform on infected devices.
Access to such information enhances our ability to develop effective countermeasures, anticipate the attackers' next steps, and ultimately disrupt their operations.
In this case, visibility into the botnet’s control panel confirmed that the ToxicPanda campaign was orchestrated by a Chinese-speaking group—a rare occurrence in Europe, where this campaign has primarily occurred. The insights gleaned from the panel have further deepened our understanding of this group's operational capabilities and methods of conducting fraud.
The “Machine Management” interface is one of the most important sections within the C2 panel. As shown in the following image, this section provides the fraud operators with a detailed overview of each infected Android device connected to the botnet.
This interface is organized into several columns, each representing various aspects of the compromised devices, including:
TAs also have various controls, including updating or resetting scripts, clearing the cache, or removing devices from the botnet. These controls enable fraudsters to maintain or upgrade their malware on the devices, ensuring long-term persistence or adjusting their tactics to remain undetected by anti-fraud measures.
A key feature of this botnet is the ability to initiate On-Device Fraud (ODF), a method increasingly favored by banking fraudsters. The “Machine Management” interface allows operators to request real-time remote access to any connected Android device. Once connected, the operator can perform fraudulent transactions directly from the victim’s certified device.
Further analysis of the ToxicPanda botnet infrastructure granted our team access to comprehensive telemetry data, revealing the full extent of this campaign. This dataset allowed us to map out the geographic distribution of over 1,500 infected devices, highlighting the regions currently experiencing the heaviest concentration of infections.
The aggregated data, visualized in the map above, clearly illustrates a pronounced targeting pattern:
This geographical distribution underscores the significant reach and adaptability of the ToxicPanda botnet. By leveraging these insights, we better understand the botnet's operational focus and can more effectively strategize region-specific defenses. The visibility into regional infection patterns also helps financial institutions and local authorities in the most impacted areas prioritize mitigation efforts and fortify their anti-fraud measures accordingly.
Moreover, our analysts can provide valuable insights into the geographic origin of TA connections and the services they rely on to access the C2 panel. The following image gives an aggregated, high-level view of these extracted telemetries, highlighting key operational patterns:
Our telemetry data indicates that the threat posed by ToxicPanda is becoming increasingly prominent, with a botnet comprising thousands of devices, primarily across Europe. This TA actively targets Europe and potentially extends its reach into the LATAM region, leveraging linguistic and cultural ties.
ToxicPanda needs to demonstrate more advanced and unique capabilities that would complicate its analysis. However, artefacts such as logging information, dead code, and debugging files suggest that the malware may either be in its early stages of development or undergoing extensive code refactoring—particularly given its similarities with TGToxic.
More broadly, we observe a marked shift as Chinese-speaking TAs expand their focus into new geographical regions, especially targeting financial institutions and customers in pursuit of banking fraud opportunities. This trend underscores the mobile security ecosystem's escalating challenge, as the marketplace is increasingly saturated with malware and new threat actors emerge.
An important question arising from this analysis is not just how to defend against threats like ToxicPanda but why contemporary antivirus solutions have struggled to detect a threat that is, in technical terms, relatively straightforward. Although there is no single answer, the lack of proactive, real-time detection systems is a primary issue.
Current security approaches emphasize isolated point detections rather than establishing a comprehensive “Early Warning system”. Such a system would enable continuous monitoring of suspicious applications, supporting timely classification and mitigation before a full-scale threat can materialize.
ToxicPanda Sample:
C2 servers:
Distribution:
Landing pages:
